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The 1992 Securities Scam: How Harshad Mehta, the ‘Big Bull’, Moved Bank Money Into Shares, and How It All Fell Apart

In April 1992 the Sensex stood at a record 4,467 and one Bombay broker was a national hero. The next morning a newspaper asked where the State Bank of India’s money had gone. The ready-forward deals, the fake bank receipts, the crash, the ₹1 crore claim against a Prime Minister, the trials and a death in custody.

By Simar, TrendingPunjabi news desk 17 min read WhatsApp

The 1992 Securities Scam: How Harshad Mehta, the ‘Big Bull’, Moved Bank Money Into Shares, and How It All Fell Apart
Photo: Niyantha Shekhar · CC BY 2.0 · Wikimedia Commons

In short

  • In 1991–92 the Sensex rose from 956 to 4,467, and Harshad Mehta was its hero. Much of the money behind the boom came out of banks.
  • The tools were ready-forward deals between banks and bank receipts (BRs). Bank cheques were credited to brokers, and some BRs, from tiny banks like the Bank of Karad, had no securities behind them.
  • Sucheta Dalal’s Times of India report of 23 April 1992 on a hole at the State Bank of India set off the collapse. The RBI’s Janakiraman Committee put the banks’ gross problem exposure at ₹4,024.45 crore.
  • In June 1993 Mehta claimed he had paid ₹1 crore to Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao. Rao denied it, and it was never proved.
  • A Special Court convicted Mehta in the Maruti Udyog case in 1999. He died in custody in Thane on 31 December 2001, and the Supreme Court upheld the conviction in 2003.

The case file

Convicted
Who
Harshad Shantilal Mehta (1954–2001), Bombay stockbroker known as the ‘Big Bull’
What
Bank money diverted to brokers through ready-forward deals and bank receipts (BRs) with no securities behind them, April 1991 to May 1992
How big
Gross ‘problem exposure’ of banks: ₹4,024.45 crore (RBI’s Janakiraman Committee, April 1993). ‘Over ₹3,500 crore’ diverted (Barua and Varma, IIM Ahmedabad, 1993)
Exposed
Sucheta Dalal, The Times of India, 23 April 1992
Inquiries
RBI’s Janakiraman Committee (six reports, May 1992 to April 1993); Joint Parliamentary Committee under Ram Niwas Mirdha (report 21 December 1993)
Verdict
Convicted by the Special Court in Bombay, September 1999 (Maruti Udyog case); five years’ rigorous imprisonment; upheld by the Supreme Court, 14 January 2003, two judges to one
Died
31 December 2001, in judicial custody, after chest pain in Thane Central Jail. Most of his other cases were still open
In this story · 13 parts
  1. 23 Apr 19924,467
  2. 1984–1992The boy from Paneli Moti
  3. Apr 1991–May 1992How bank money reached the share market
  4. Apr 1992The hole at the State Bank
  5. May–Jun 1992The crash
  6. Aug 1992Two inquiries, one resignation letter
  7. 16 Jun 1993A suitcase in Bombay
  8. Sep 1999In the dock
  9. 31 Dec 2001New Year’s Eve in Thane
  10. Part 10Both sides
  11. Part 11Claims and myths, checked
  12. 3 Nov 1994What changed
  13. Part 13Our take
Part 1

4,467

Bombay

On Wednesday, 22 April 1992, the Sensex closed at 4,467. Fifteen months earlier, on 25 January 1991, it had stood at 956. Nobody in Bombay had ever seen money multiply like this. Investors followed one man’s every move. His name was on every lip: Harshad Mehta, the Big Bull.

That same day, a reporter at The Times of India got a tip. Sucheta Dalal had been getting tips about the market for about a year. An acquaintance of her news editor said the Big Bull had been called in by the State Bank of India, the country’s biggest bank. SBI wanted about ₹500 crore back. At once.

Dalal later described how she checked it. She made call after call. A colleague went to the SBI canteen to listen for gossip about Mehta’s visit. When she put the story to a senior banker, he would not talk, but he did not deny it either.

On 23 April 1992 the story ran on the front page. The paper softened it and did not use Mehta’s name; it said ‘Big Bull’. Mehta denied it. By Dalal’s account, the SBI chairman, M.N. Goiporia, called it a figment of her imagination.

It was not. Within weeks, India would learn that the greatest bull run in its history had been fed with money taken from its banks.

The tall Bombay Stock Exchange tower on Dalal Street in Mumbai, seen from the street below
The Bombay Stock Exchange building on Dalal Street in 2007. In 1991–92, before screen trading, brokers shouted their deals on the trading floor here.Photo: Niyantha Shekhar · CC BY 2.0 · Wikimedia Commons
Part 2

The boy from Paneli Moti

Bombay

Harshad Shantilal Mehta was born on 29 July 1954 in Paneli Moti, a village in Gujarat’s Rajkot district. His father ran a small textile business. The family lived in Borivali in Bombay, then in Raipur, where young Harshad played school cricket, and came back to Bombay in the 1970s.

He took a commerce degree from Lala Lajpatrai College in 1976. Then came years of small jobs: selling hosiery, working as a cement contractor, sorting diamonds, a clerk’s desk at an insurance company. Then he found a clerk’s job at a broking firm, and learned the market from the inside. In 1984 he got his own broker’s licence and set up a firm called Grow More Research and Asset Management.

By 1990 the papers called him the Amitabh Bachchan of the stock market. He bought big into a few shares and talked them up, and the market followed. His favourite was ACC, the cement company. Business Standard later reckoned he moved it from about ₹300 a share in 1989 to about ₹10,000 in the 1992 boom. He defended the prices with a ‘replacement cost’ theory: what would it cost to build these factories today?

India is a turnaround scrip on the Global Stock Exchange.Harshad Mehta

He liked a show. His enemies were the ‘bear cartel’, the brokers who bet on prices falling. He called them ‘prophets of gloom’ in an interview with India Today. A television channel filmed him feeding peanuts to bears at the Bombay zoo. By 1992 he was among the highest income tax payers in India, ThePrint reported.

But a question hung over the boom. Where was all this money coming from?

Part 3

How bank money reached the share market

Bombay

To understand the scam, picture two markets side by side in Bombay. In one, banks lent to each other against government bonds, at about 18 to 20 per cent a year. In the other, stockbrokers borrowed to buy shares, in a cash market called badla, at 35 to 40 per cent. That is how two economists at IIM Ahmedabad, Samir Barua and Jayanth Varma, laid it out in 1993. Anyone who could move cheap bank money into the share market stood to make a fortune.

The bridge was the ready-forward deal, or RF. It is a short loan between two banks, usually for about 15 days. The borrowing bank ‘sells’ government securities to the lender and buys them back later at a slightly higher price. The difference is the interest. Barua and Varma compared it to a pawnbroker lending against jewellery. It is safe, as long as the jewellery is real.

Three things turned this safe loan into a broker’s free cash.

  • The broker in the middle. Banks began to settle these deals through brokers, the way share trades were settled. The cheque and the securities passed through the broker’s hands.
  • The cheque that went to the wrong account. A cheque made out to a bank was credited to the broker’s own account instead. Banks already did this as a favour for big customers, to save a day or two of clearing.
  • The security that was not there. Instead of real bonds, the lender often took a bank receipt, or BR: a note saying ‘we hold the securities for you’. A BR was an IOU. Some had nothing behind them at all.

The fake BRs came from small, little-known banks. The RBI’s inquiry found the Bank of Karad and the Metropolitan Co-operative Bank had issued BRs and transfer forms worth ₹1,470 crore that big lenders held with no securities behind them. A sensible bank would have lent the tiny Bank of Karad perhaps ₹50 lakh, Barua and Varma wrote. Standard Chartered took its BRs for hundreds of crores.

Then the money went into shares. Shares went up. Brokers sold some, paid the banks their interest on time, kept the rest, and did it again. While prices rose, everyone looked clever. The banks booked fat profits. Nobody asked many questions.

In one line: a deal meant to be a safe loan from one bank to another became an unsecured loan to a broker, and the money went into the stock market.

The government’s ‘free market’ push of 1991 added pressure. The new government had opened up the economy, and the boom ran on hope for the private sector. Public sector companies had big surplus cash. Banks competed to earn more on it. The RBI had been looking into banks’ bond deals since January 1992. But its own checks, Barua and Varma later wrote, had broken down along with the banks’.

Part 4

The hole at the State Bank

Bombay

The RBI’s committee later set out exactly how the State Bank’s problem came to light. Towards the end of March 1992, the RBI heard that SBI had bought a large amount of government bonds on a ready-forward basis one day before a rise in the interest rate on such bonds. On 2 April it asked SBI for a statement of its investments.

SBI could not produce one. It had not matched its books with its account at the RBI since November 1991. When it did, the gap was huge. Deals worth ₹649 crore had gone through Harshad Mehta with no securities delivered.

Between 13 and 24 April 1992, Mehta paid SBI back about ₹622 crore, the committee recorded, through payment orders from ANZ Grindlays Bank and a cheque from Syndicate Bank. SBI was still chasing the last ₹26 crore. Dalal’s story landed in the middle of those repayments.

The Gothic-style State Bank of India Mumbai Main Branch building in the Fort area, lit up after sunset
The State Bank of India’s Mumbai Main Branch in Fort, in 2011. In April 1992 SBI found deals worth ₹649 crore routed through Mehta with no securities delivered.Photo: Manjul Kumar · CC0 · Wikimedia Commons

Then the other holes opened. The National Housing Bank, owned by the RBI, had been doing huge bond deals through brokers. NHB’s exposure came to ₹1,271 crore, the committee found. In court years later, the CBI said two NHB officers issued ten cheques for over ₹700 crore in favour of SBI between November 1991 and April 1992, without getting securities in return, and that the money reached Mehta’s account.

On 30 April 1992, the RBI Governor set up a committee under his deputy, R. Janakiraman, to dig through it all. It looked at 180 banks and finance companies, whose bond deals in that one year alone numbered more than 87,000. Its first report came on 31 May 1992. Its last, on 29 April 1993, gave the number that is still quoted.

How big was it? The Janakiraman Committee put the gross ‘problem exposure’ of banks at ₹4,024.45 crore. Barua and Varma estimated ‘over ₹3,500 crore’ diverted. Nikhil Chakravartty of Mainstream wrote of ₹5,000 crore ‘by cautious calculations’. These are figures for the whole scam, with many brokers and banks in it, not for one man.

The committee’s tables showed something else. Harshad Mehta was not the busiest broker in the bond market. Another broker put through more than twice as many deals with banks. The Big Bull was the face of the scam. He was not all of it.

Part 5

The crash

Bombay

The fall was as fast as the rise. In less than two months after the scam came out, share prices fell by more than 40 per cent, wiping out about ₹1 lakh crore of market value, Barua and Varma wrote. The Sensex dropped from around 4,500 to about 2,500.

The Bank of Karad, which had issued the empty receipts, was put into liquidation. Its depositors had done nothing wrong.

In June 1992 the government brought an ordinance that set up a Special Court for the scam cases and a custodian to freeze the property of anyone accused. It also voided every deal those brokers had made since April 1991. Overnight, shares that had passed through their hands became ‘tainted’ and could not be sold. Small investors who had bought them honestly were stuck. Barua and Varma called the measures ‘draconian’ and said they, more than the scam itself, caused much of the panic.

Reforms slowed. Critics called Mehta a child of liberalisation. SEBI held back approvals for private mutual funds. The boom that had made a broker famous now made the whole market look like a fraud.

Readers’ poll

Who carries most of the blame for the 1992 scam?

Tap an answer to see what other readers think.

Part 6

Two inquiries, one resignation letter

New Delhi

Parliament wanted its own answers. On 6 August 1992 a motion in the Lok Sabha set up a Joint Parliamentary Committee, only the second such committee in India’s history. It was chaired by Ram Niwas Mirdha, a senior Congress leader.

The round old Parliament House in New Delhi with its long row of pillars, seen from Vijay Chowk
The old Parliament House in New Delhi, in 2014. The Joint Parliamentary Committee on the scam presented its report here on 21 December 1993.Photo: Nikhilb239 · CC BY-SA 4.0 · Wikimedia Commons

The JPC’s report came on 21 December 1993. It said a failure to enforce banking rules had led to the scandal, UPI reported. It named four foreign banks, ANZ Grindlays, Standard Chartered, Bank of America and Citibank, as central to it. It cited Finance Minister Manmohan Singh and two other ministers for negligence.

Singh, the face of the 1991 reforms, sent his resignation to Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao on 24 December. Business leaders begged Rao not to accept it. He did not, and Singh stayed on as finance minister until 1996. The JPC’s recommendations, later reviews noted, were neither fully accepted nor carried out.

Part 7

A suitcase in Bombay

Bombay

By the summer of 1993 Harshad Mehta was out on bail and waiting for trial. On Wednesday, 16 June 1993, he called a press conference in Bombay. The room was packed. Beside him sat his lawyer, Ram Jethmalani, an opposition MP.

Mehta made the biggest claim of his life. He said he had paid ₹1 crore to the Prime Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao, for political patronage. According to UPI’s report that day, he said he carried the cash in suitcases to the Prime Minister’s official home in New Delhi on 4 and 5 November 1991, and that it was handed to Rao’s personal secretary. He said he had already put the charge in an affidavit to the JPC.

There was a detail behind it. The JPC had found that Mehta withdrew large sums in cash on those two days from two Delhi branches of ANZ Grindlays Bank, and had asked him who got the money. At the press conference he showed reporters a suitcase, to prove that ₹1 crore could fit inside.

Rao had just flown back from Oman. He waited several hours, then issued a short statement denying he had received any payoff and calling the story malicious and unfounded. The Congress spokesman, V.N. Gadgil, said the charge was meant to shake the government.

Designed to create political instability in the country.V.N. Gadgil, Congress spokesman, June 1993

The opposition demanded Rao resign. Share prices fell again. Sceptics doubted that so much cash could fit in one case, or that anyone would bribe a Prime Minister this way.

The claim was never proved. No court ever found that the money was paid. Rao served out his term.

Part 8

In the dock

Bombay

The cases against Mehta piled up: criminal cases from the CBI, hundreds of civil claims from banks, and tax demands. The custodian had frozen his family’s investments in June 1992. SEBI later banned him from the market for life.

He did not go quiet. Barred from trading, he wrote share tips in newspaper columns, taught at his old college, and launched a stock-tip website, harshad.com. He planned a ‘Harshad Mehta Fan Club’ for followers.

The first verdict came in the Maruti Udyog case. The CBI said that between 1989 and 1991, about ₹39 crore of the car maker’s money, paid out in four banker’s cheques meant for ANZ Grindlays Bank, was credited to Mehta’s account. Mehta’s lawyers said these were short-term loans that he had repaid with interest.

On 27 and 28 September 1999, the Special Court in Bombay convicted him, along with three others, among them a Maruti finance officer and a UCO Bank officer. One accused was acquitted. Mehta got five years of rigorous imprisonment.

He appealed. He died before the Supreme Court ruled, and his widow, Jyoti Mehta, carried on the appeal. On 14 January 2003, a bench of three judges upheld his conviction by a majority. Justice M.B. Shah disagreed. The court also cleared one of the other convicted men on appeal.

The cases outlived almost everyone in them. On 25 November 2016, twenty-four years on, a Special Court judge in Mumbai convicted Mehta’s brother Sudhir, two former NHB officers, a former SBI officer and two others in the NHB case. Three accused were acquitted. The case against Harshad had ended with his death.

Siphoning of crores of rupees of a nationalised bank.Justice Shalini Phansalkar-Joshi, Special Court, 2016

The court let them appeal to the Supreme Court. We found no report of how those appeals ended.

Readers’ poll

Some scam cases from 1992 were still being decided in 2016. What is your view?

Tap an answer to see what other readers think.

Part 9

New Year’s Eve in Thane

Thane

In his last months, Harshad Mehta was in jail again. Business Standard reported that in November 2001 the CBI had arrested him and his brothers Ashwin and Sudhir in a case about some 27 lakh ‘missing’ shares of 90 big companies, worth about ₹250 crore. The brothers said the shares had been lost or stolen. The CBI said the family had moved them to relatives and staff and sold them quietly. That case never came to trial against Harshad.

On 21 December a Special Court refused them bail and sent them to judicial custody until 4 January 2002. Harshad was held in Thane Central Jail, near Mumbai.

At about 11 pm on Sunday, 30 December 2001, he complained of chest pain. He was taken to Thane civil hospital. Police said he collapsed while a doctor was examining him and died at about 12:40 am on 31 December. A heart attack, they said. He was 47.

ThePrint later noted India Today’s report that the Sensex rose 77 points on the day of his death.

Some people still say he was killed. No inquiry or court has found anything to support that. The police account is a heart attack in custody.

Part 10

Both sides

For investigators, Harshad Mehta was the man at the centre of a fraud on India’s banks. For his family, he was a broker who played by the market’s rules and was made to carry the blame for a whole system. Here is each case in its own words, as far as the record shows.

Mastermind or scapegoat?

The investigators and the courts

  • The RBI’s Janakiraman Committee found a systematic diversion of bank money into the personal accounts of certain brokers, through bank purchases, ready-forward deals and loans.
  • SBI found deals worth ₹649 crore routed through Mehta with no securities delivered.
  • In the NHB case, the CBI said ten cheques worth over ₹700 crore went out without sale memos, securities or BRs from Mehta.
  • The Special Court convicted Mehta in the Maruti Udyog case in 1999, and the Supreme Court upheld it in 2003.

Harshad Mehta and his family

  • Mehta said he was a ‘scapegoat to serve ulterior motives’, and that he could pay back what he owed if allowed to.
  • His family says Bombay Stock Exchange rules let him trade as both broker and principal, and that crediting pay orders to his account was not theft.
  • They say the banks knew, profited, and later rewrote their records to match RBI rules.
  • He repaid SBI about ₹622 crore in April 1992. The family says SBI still owes him a surplus, and that it has since won more than 1,200 cases filed against it.

The economists (Barua and Varma, 1993)

  • The scam grew out of over-regulation: walls between markets made huge profits possible for anyone who broke through.
  • The government, the RBI and the banks were as accountable as the brokers.
  • The ‘tainted shares’ law punished innocent investors and did more to crash the market than the scam itself.

Readers’ poll

Harshad Mehta: mastermind of a fraud, or the face of a broken system?

Tap an answer to see what other readers think.

Part 11

Claims and myths, checked

Claim 1

Mehta paid ₹1 crore to Prime Minister Narasimha Rao

Why people believed it

Mehta said so on 16 June 1993, with his lawyer beside him, and showed a suitcase. The JPC had found big cash withdrawals by him on 4 and 5 November 1991.

What the record shows

Rao denied it the same day, calling the story malicious and unfounded. No court ever found the payment was made.

UnprovenNever proved. It remains Mehta’s word against Rao’s.

Claim 2

Harshad Mehta alone stole ₹5,000 crore

Why people believed it

The scam is often told as one man’s heist, with ever bigger numbers.

What the record shows

The RBI committee’s ₹4,024.45 crore is the banks’ total problem exposure across many brokers and banks. SBI’s own loss through Mehta was largely repaid: about ₹622 crore of ₹649 crore by 24 April 1992.

BustedA myth. The numbers are for the whole scam, not one man.

Claim 3

The scam alone caused the crash

Why people believed it

The market fell from about 4,500 to about 2,500 after the scam came out.

What the record shows

Barua and Varma argued that taking ₹3,500 crore out of a ₹2,50,000 crore market should not crash it. They blamed the ‘tainted shares’ ordinance and the slowdown of reforms.

Still openPartly true. The panic that followed did much of the damage.

Claim 4

No bank lost a penny

Why people believed it

Mehta’s family says so on its website, and says banks have since been paid ₹1,716 crore under court decrees.

What the record shows

The RBI committee found an exposure of ₹1,271 crore at the National Housing Bank alone. The Bank of Karad went into liquidation. Many claims are still in dispute.

BustedThe record does not support it, though much money was later recovered.

Claim 5

He was murdered in jail

Why people believed it

He died suddenly in custody at 47, while facing cases that touched powerful people.

What the record shows

Police said he had chest pain at about 11 pm and died of a heart attack in hospital shortly after midnight. We found no inquiry or court finding of foul play.

UnprovenNo evidence. A rumour, not a finding.

Part 12

What changed

Bombay

The scam was a disaster. It was also the push India’s markets needed.

SEBI, the Securities and Exchange Board of India, had been set up in 1988 with little power. On 30 January 1992, just months before the scam broke, an ordinance made it a statutory body, and Parliament passed the SEBI Act that year. After the scam, SEBI became the market’s real policeman, with power over brokers and exchanges, and it kept gaining powers through the 1990s.

The RBI tightened bank rules. The Janakiraman Committee recommended that ready-forward deals be allowed only in government securities, and the bank receipt system was overhauled.

The biggest change was on the trading floor. The National Stock Exchange, set up in 1992 by public sector institutions, began with bonds on 30 June 1994 and with shares on 3 November 1994. It had no shouting floor. Brokers across the country traded on computer screens, and anyone could see the prices. The old Bombay Stock Exchange switched to screens with its BOLT system in March 1995. The Depositories Act of 1996 began the move from paper share certificates to electronic accounts.

Exchange Plaza, the glass-fronted office tower of the National Stock Exchange of India in Mumbai
Exchange Plaza, the National Stock Exchange’s office in Mumbai, in 2018. The NSE, set up in 1992, brought screen trading to Indian shares in November 1994.Photo: KirtiKakad · CC BY-SA 4.0 · Wikimedia Commons

None of this ended fraud. Another market scandal broke in 2001, and a later JPC blamed Ketan Parekh, a broker who had once worked at Mehta’s firm, for rigging prices. But the tricks of 1992, cheques to the wrong account and receipts for bonds that did not exist, became much harder.

In 2020, Hansal Mehta’s web series Scam 1992, based on the book by Sucheta Dalal and Debashis Basu, made the story famous with a new generation.

The tall Reserve Bank of India headquarters tower in Mumbai against the sky
The Reserve Bank of India’s headquarters in Mumbai, in 2005. Its deputy governor R. Janakiraman led the inquiry; economists faulted the RBI’s own bond office for spotting the gaps too late.Photo: Unknown author · CC BY-SA 3.0 · Wikimedia Commons
Part 13

Our take

It is easy to tell the 1992 scam as the story of one flashy man. That is the story the films like. The record tells a bigger one.

A court found Harshad Mehta guilty of crimes in the Maruti case, and the Supreme Court agreed. But he could not have done it alone. Bank officers handed over cheques without securities. Small banks signed receipts for bonds they did not have. A big foreign bank lent hundreds of crores to a tiny one. The RBI’s own bond office was slow to spot the gaps. Everyone was happy while prices rose.

And it took a reporter, a tip and a few phone calls to make the country ask a simple question: where is the money? That question changed how India buys and sells shares. The cases dragged on for decades. The screens are still there.

Test yourself

7 questions on this story

  1. Which newspaper ran Sucheta Dalal’s report on 23 April 1992?

  2. What was a bank receipt (BR) supposed to be?

  3. Which two small banks issued BRs that, the RBI’s committee found, had no backing?

  4. What gross ‘problem exposure’ did the Janakiraman Committee find?

  5. On 16 June 1993, Mehta said he had paid ₹1 crore to whom?

  6. In which case did the Special Court convict Mehta in 1999?

  7. Which exchange started screen trading in shares on 3 November 1994?

Quick check: which came first?

Two moments from this story. Tap the one that happened first.

 

Questions people ask

What was the Harshad Mehta scam?

Between April 1991 and May 1992, brokers led by Harshad Mehta used ready-forward deals and bank receipts to move bank money into their own accounts and into the share market. The RBI’s Janakiraman Committee put the banks’ gross problem exposure at ₹4,024.45 crore.

Who exposed the 1992 scam?

Sucheta Dalal of The Times of India. Her front-page report of 23 April 1992 said a ‘Big Bull’ had been asked to repay about ₹500 crore to the State Bank of India. The RBI’s own committee later noted the report.

Was Harshad Mehta convicted?

Yes, in one case that reached a verdict in his lifetime. The Special Court in Bombay convicted him in the Maruti Udyog case in September 1999 and gave him five years’ rigorous imprisonment. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction on 14 January 2003, after his death, by two judges to one.

Did Harshad Mehta pay ₹1 crore to Narasimha Rao?

Mehta said so at a press conference in Bombay on 16 June 1993. Rao called the story malicious and unfounded, and the claim was never proved.

How did Harshad Mehta die?

He was in judicial custody at Thane Central Jail. He complained of chest pain late on 30 December 2001 and died at Thane civil hospital at about 12:40 am on 31 December. Police said it was a heart attack. He was 47.

How we wrote this. Researched from the RBI committee reports, the Supreme Court judgment, contemporary reports and the other sources listed below, and written in our own words by the TrendingPunjabi desk with the help of an AI model. Harshad Mehta was convicted in the Maruti Udyog case (Special Court, Bombay, 1999; upheld by the Supreme Court, 2003); his other cases ended with his death, and we describe the rest of the case against him as what investigators found or alleged. His ₹1 crore claim against P.V. Narasimha Rao was denied and never proved. The scam’s size differs by source: ₹4,024.45 crore (the RBI’s Janakiraman Committee, gross problem exposure), ‘over ₹3,500 crore’ (Barua and Varma) and higher popular figures; we say whose figure each is. Accounts also differ on the number of cases against Mehta and on details of the 1993 press conference. His family’s case is taken from its own website and is labelled as theirs.

Sources

  1. Reserve Bank of India (via The 1991 Project): Reports of the Committee to Enquire into Securities Transactions of Banks and Financial Institutions (Janakiraman Committee), 1992–93
  2. Vikalpa, IIM Ahmedabad, Jan–Mar 1993: Securities Scam: Genesis, Mechanics and Impact, by Samir K. Barua and Jayanth R. Varma
  3. Supreme Court of India (Legal Authority): Ram Narain Popli v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 14 January 2003 (Maruti Udyog case appeals)
  4. UPI, 16 June 1993: Broker shocks nation by claiming he bribed premier
  5. UPI, 24 December 1993: Architect of India’s economic reforms resigns
  6. UPI, 25 December 1993: Finance minister’s resignation offer dismays Indian business
  7. Mainstream: Uphold JPC’s credibility, by Nikhil Chakravartty (first published July 1993)
  8. Moneylife: Sucheta Dalal recounts how she broke the story (Moneylife, 2012, reposted)
  9. The Quint, April 2023: 31 years on: Sucheta Dalal on the Harshad Mehta scam
  10. ThePrint, July 2022: ‘Scapegoat’ or mastermind of 1992 scam? Harshad Mehta’s fall from grace still haunts family
  11. Business Standard, January 2002: From Raipur to Thane jail, it’s been a long journey
  12. Dawn, January 2002: Mehta dies in police custody
  13. DeshGujarat, November 2016: Harshad Mehta’s brother, 5 others convicted in securities scam (PTI)
  14. Governance Now: Bangaru Laxman was ahead of times, he preferred dollars
  15. ThePrint: JPC for Rafale? Panel probes in past have done little to fix accountability
  16. harshadmehta.in: Allegations and facts (the Mehta family’s account)
  17. Wikipedia: Joint parliamentary committee
  18. Wikipedia: Harshad Mehta
  19. Wikipedia: 1992 Indian stock market scam
  20. Wikipedia: Securities and Exchange Board of India
  21. Wikipedia: National Stock Exchange of India
  22. Wikipedia: Bombay Stock Exchange
  23. Wikipedia: Sucheta Dalal
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